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ABSTRACT 
We present, in a synthetic way, some of the main findings from ten 
studies that were conducted in the field of ethics in politics, using the  
Functional  Measurement  framework.  These  studies  were  about (a) 
Angolan and Mozambican people’s views about the legitimacy of 
military-humanitarian interventions, (b) French people’s perspectives 
regarding the government’s responsibility for the health of consumers of 
illicit substances, (c) Togolese people’s views about the acceptability of 
political amnesties in a time of political transition, (d) the perspective 
of victims of the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda regarding the 
attribution of guilt by association to offspring of perpetrators, (e) slave 
descendants’ views about the acceptability of national policies on 
reparations for slavery, (f) Colombian people’s willingness to forgive 
perpetrators of violence who harmed family members during the civil 
war, (g) the attitudes of French and Colombian people about national 
drug control policies, (h) Indian students’ views about the appropriateness 
of the death penalty for murder or rape, (i) Colombian people’s 
perspectives regarding corruption, and finally (j) Venezuelan people’s 
conceptualization of human rights. The main findings are discussed in 
reference to six of the foundations of Moral Foundations Theory. 
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Este texto presenta, de forma resumida, algunos de los 
principales resultados de diez estudios que se realizaron 
en el campo de la ética y la política, en el marco de la 
Medición Funcional. Estos estudios trataron de: (a) los 
puntos de vista de la gente de Angola y Mozambique sobre 
la legitimidad de las intervenciones militares-humanitaria; 
(b) las perspectivas de los franceses con respecto a la 
responsabilidad del gobierno con la salud de los 
consumidores de sustancias ilícitas; (c) las perspectivas de 
las personas de Togo acerca de la aceptabilidad de 
amnistías políticas en un momento de transición política; 
(d) las perspectivas de las víctimas del genocidio de los 
Tutsis en Ruanda en cuanto a la atribución de culpabilidad 
a los descendientes de los perpetradores de violencia; (e) 
los puntos de vista de los descendientes de esclavos acerca 
de la aceptabilidad de las políticas nacionales de 
reparaciones por la esclavitud; (f) la disposición de los 
colombianos a perdonar autores de la violencia que 
causaron daño a miembros de la familia durante el 
conflicto armado interno; (g) las actitudes de los franceses 
y colombianos acerca de las políticas nacionales de control 
de drogas; (h) los puntos de vista de los estudiantes indios 
acerca de la idoneidad de la pena de muerte por asesinato o 
violación; (i) las perspectivas de los colombianos con 
respecto a la corrupción, y, finalmente, (j) la 
conceptualización de los derechos humanos en la población 
venezolana. Los principales resultados se discuten en 
relación con seis de los fundamentos de la Teoría de los 
Fundamentos Morales. 
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Functional measurement in the field of 
ethics in politics 
 
 
According to Aristotle (-350, 2004), ethics is 
the determination —in each concrete set of 
circumstances encountered in daily life— of 
what constitutes the more acceptable conduct or, 
in no few cases, the less unacceptable conduct. 
The aim of the present article is to report, in 
a synthetic way, a series of empirical studies 
on ethics which, using Functional Measurement 
(Anderson, 1981, 1982, see also Anderson in 
this special issue), have been conducted in the 
specific field of ethics in politics. 
These studies are listed in Table 1. In this 
table, the six domains suggested in Haidt’s 
(2013) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) — 
care, fairness, authority, loyalty, disgust, and 
also liberty— have been used as a convenient 
framework   for   classification.   For   example, 
the  first  study  to  be  reported,  which  bears 
on the acceptability of military-humanitarian 
interventions, has been classified into the MFT’s 
care domain because protecting endangered 
people is, for evident reasons, exemplary of what 
is intended by care and protection. 
 
Table 1 
Classification of the Nine Reported Studies into 
Six of the Foundations of Moral Foundations 
Theory 
 
Source: own work 
 
Also, the spirit in which these studies were 
conducted is fully consistent with MFT’s stance 
regarding the nature of human thinking about 
moral issues. In daily life, moral thinking 
expresses itself through moral judgment, that is, 
the ability to react quickly to daily situations 
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involving moral issues. Moral judgement can 
be defined as an implicit cognitive process that 
corresponds to what cognitive psychologists call 
System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). It is grounded in 
human evolution and probably goes back to late 
mammals’ development. 
Our focus on moral judgment is not a denial 
of  moral  reasoning.  Moral  reasoning  refers 
to the ability to deliberate consciously about 
moral  behaviour,  that  is,  to  weigh  the  pros 
and cons of complex situations involving moral 
issues (Gibbs, 2010). Moral reasoning is an 
explicit, relatively slow, cognitive process that 
corresponds to what cognitive psychologists call 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). Moral reasoning 
is, however, largely the province of moral 
philosophers. In ordinary people’s daily life, 
moral reasoning occurs only in particular 
circumstances, for example, when they are asked 
to justify their views publicly. “Intuitions come 
first, strategic reasoning second” (Haidt, 2013, p. 
14), if the latter comes at all. 
The studies synthesised in this review have 
a common methodological and theoretical 
framework:   Information   Integration   Theory 
(IIT,  Anderson,  2008).  They  are  the  heirs 
of the many studies on moral development 
conducted  in  this  framework  (see  Anderson, 
2015   for   a   review).   The   oldest   of   these 
studies,  published  at  the  end  of  the  1970s, 
had largely anticipated MFT’s stand. Whereas 
typical developmental psychologists at this time 
examined  moral  development  by  presenting 
their young participants with moral dilemmas, 
psychologists working in the framework of IIT 
already used realistic scenarios, grounded on 
children’s and adolescents’ real life, and their 
conclusions regarding the structure of moral 
development  were  severely  at  variance  with 
the  reigning  view  (e.g.,  Surber,  1977).  Also, 
like MFT, they explored a large set of moral 
issues, including blame, punishment, and legal 
judgment (e.g., Hommers, 1988); deserving, 
equity, and fairness/unfairness (e.g., Farkas & 
Anderson, 1979); lies and deceit; and gratitude 
and forgiveness (e.g., Girard & Mullet, 1997). 
Problems of ethics arise most often in 
situations that can be considered as complex, 
indeed as emotionally charged, in situations in 
which certain elements point in one direction and 
other elements in the opposite direction. In other 
words, multiple factors are most often in play, 
and they are likely to contribute in a complex 
way to the final judgment relating to conformity 
with ethics. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
we have found in Information Integration Theory 
—a theory of human judgment in daily life– a 
convenient tool for examining the way people 
intuitively balance the pros and the cons in such 
circumstances when determining whether it is 
fair to attribute guilt to offspring of perpetrators 
of a genocide;, whether it is, in time of civil war, 
a betrayal to forgive the perpetrators of violence 
against family members; or whether rape is so 
disgusting that serial rapists deserve the death 
penalty. 
An interesting feature of the studies that are 
reported here is their international character. 
They   were   conducted   in   many   countries: 
Angola, Colombia, France (metropolitan, but 
also Martinique), India, Lebanon, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, and Venezuela. Participants were 
usually people who were more or less directly 
involved  in  political  troubles  and  violence, 
such  as  victims  of  the  genocide  in  Rwanda 
or citizens affected by governmental instability 
in Venezuela. The extremely flexible character 
of the IIT methodology allowed us to gather 
meaningful data from people usually untrained 
in  psychological  experiments  without  having 
to spend disproportionate amounts of time and 
money (see Mullet , Morales, Makris, Rogé, & 
Muñoz Sastre, 2012). The key feature of this 
methodology resides, in our view, in the use of 
realistic scenarios, of the kind of stories any one 
can listen to when waiting at the hairdresser. 
Everybody can make sense of them, and respond 




Care vs. harm: The legitimacy of 
humanitarian military interventions 
 
 
Neto et al. (2013) examined (a) the extent to 
which  educated  people  living  in  two  African 
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countries  with  much  internal  conflict  in  the 
past, but with contrasting experiences regarding 
UN interventions - Angola and Mozambique - 
agreed with the idea that humanitarian military 
interventions by UN forces can be legitimate, 
and (b) the contextual factors that may impact on 
their level of acceptance of these interventions. 
Protecting vulnerable people from state- 
orchestrated abuses, forced displacement, and 
other forms of violence, not to speak of mass 
killing, is undisputedly a noble objective, likely 
to rally public opinion, at least in Western 
countries. Humanitarian military interventions, 
however, remain controversial as they involve 
the use of force, are conducted in disregard of 
state sovereignty, and are not always regarded as 
successful or exempt from second thoughts. 
At the time of the study, nothing was known 
about public opinion in non-Western countries 
regarding such interventions. This lack was 
unfortunate because the very success of a 
humanitarian intervention depends heavily on 
the way the people who are likely to benefit from 
it conceive of it: Success depends directly on 
the collaboration between the military and the 
state-victimized people the military is supposed 
to help. 
In the study by Neto et al. (2013), 201 
university  students  from  the  areas  of  Luanda 
and Maputo, aged 18-40 were presented with 
48 realistic vignettes composed by orthogonally 
crossing the levels of five factors, partly taken 
from Chirot and Seligman (2001): 
 
a)  the economic-political situation in the 
country (good    versus    in    constant 
degradation); 
b)  the political project of the government 
(forced acculturation of the minority, 
forced displacement of the minority and 
relocation to poorer areas, or physical 
elimination); 
c)  the degree of isolation of the country 
(completely isolated country versus not 
particularly isolated country); 
d)   the  number  of  ethnic  groups  in  the 
country (two groups versus multiple 
groups); and 
e)   the level of contact between the majority 
group and the other group(s) (no contact 
and no intermarriage versus frequent 
contacts and frequent intermarriage). 
 
An example of scenario is the following: 
 
Hizrah is a very isolated country that is far from 
the main international communication axes. 
Two ethnic groups live there: the Wayas (the 
majority) and the Cingas (a minority). There are 
very few contacts between the members of the 
two groups. For example, a Waya would never 
marry a Cinga and vice versa. The economic 
situation of Hizrah is constantly deteriorating. 
In addition, this country has never experienced 
political stability. The new government in 
place, in the hands of the Wayas (the majority), 
tends to sympathize with extreme views, 
namely the complete elimination of the Cingas 
who are considered as responsible for the 
current difficulties in the country and who are 
feared by the majority. It would seem that, from 
time to time, limited killings have been 
perpetrated. The current situation is not well 
understood because the information coming 
from this country is of poor quality, and the 
international media does not usually devote 
much interest to this part of the world. 
 
The question was, “To what extent do you 
believe that, in such a case, a humanitarian 
military intervention of UN forces would be 
legitimate even in the case where the official 
government opposes it?” As many different 
attitudes   were   expected,   a   cluster   analysis 
was  applied  to  the  raw  data  (Hofmans  & 
Mullet, 2013). A four-cluster solution was 
retained, and the corresponding four “attitude 
profiles” (Anderson, 2008, p. 181) are shown in 
Figure 1. 
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Patterns of results corresponding to the four 
clusters: Always Legitimate, Mainly 
Depending on Political Project, Mainly 
Depending on Economic-Political Situation , 
and Undetermined 
 
In each panel, (a) the mean legitimacy 
judgments are on the y-axis, (b) the three 
levels of political project are on the x-axis, 
and (c) the two curves correspond to the 
two levels of economic-political situation 
Source: own work 
 
The first position was called Always 
Legitimate   because   all   acceptability   ratings 
were high, irrespective of the situation. The 
second position was called Mainly Depending 
on  Political  Project  because  the  factor  with, 
by  far,  the  largest  effect  was  the  political 
project:  An  intervention  was  considered  as 
more legitimate when the project involved the 
physical elimination of the minority than when 
the project involved forced displacement or 
forced acculturation. The third position was 
called Mainly Depending on Economic-Political 
Situation . An intervention was judged more 
acceptable when the economic-political situation 
of  the  country  was  deteriorating  than  when 
it was stable. Finally, the fourth cluster was 
called Undetermined because all acceptability 
ratings were close to the middle of the response 
scale,  irrespective  of  the  situation.  Overall, 
the Mozambicans supported interventions more 
often than did the Angolans. 
For the participants as a whole, preventing 
the massacre of a population represented a just 
cause that was sufficient to legitimize a UN 
intervention. In addition, participants living in 
a country in which a full-scale UN intervention 
had  taken  place  in  the  past  (Mozambique) 
were more supportive of UN interventions than 
participants living in a country where such an 
intervention had not taken place (Angola). 
This type of intervention was probably 
considered  by  participants  as  very  likely  to 
have positive humanitarian outcome since it is 
difficult to consider the saving of thousands of 
human lives as negative or even neutral, and 
the UN was considered as the right authority. 
Educated people in Angola and Mozambique 
would have been likely, therefore, to view as 
legitimate the UN-mandated interventions in 
Cambodia, Rwanda, and possibly East-Timor. 
In other, less dramatic cases —in particular 
when the economic-political situation was stable 
— the participants as a whole did not approve of 
military humanitarian interventions. They likely 
saw  military  interventions  in  these  cases  as 
out of proportion with the actual threat to the 
minority group. Educated people in Angola and 
Mozambique would probably, therefore, have 
considered as only mildly legitimate the UN- 
mandated military interventions in Afghanistan 
and possibly in Iraq. 
 
 
Care vs. harm: Addictive substances, 




Camus et al. (2016) examined the extent to 
which  people  consider  that  the  government 
of  their  country  is  directly  implicated  each 
time an addictive substance user’s health 
deteriorates, and whether this possible attribution 
of responsibility depends on political orientation. 
Addictive  substances  have  bad  health  effects 
on users and bad social effects. Government 
policies about these substances mediate, affect, 
and sometimes cause these undesirable effects: 
Different policies have different combinations of 
benefits and detriments. 
If  people,  in  general,  tend  to  attribute  a 
high level of responsibility to the government 
each  time  someone  in  the  country  dies  from 
the   consequences   of   tobacco,   alcohol,   or 
other substance consumption, then governments’ 
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reluctance to implement more liberal policies, for 
example, to extend the range of licit psychoactive 
substances, can be considered as relatively well 
grounded. If people tend to think that substance 
users are mainly responsible for their resulting 
bad health and that the government’s share of 
responsibility is low, governments may feel less 
pressured by public opinion and more open to 
changes in policy based on scientific evidence. 
In the study by Camus et al. (2016), 236 
participants, aged 18-86 were presented with 80 
realistic vignettes composed by the orthogonal 
crossing of five factors: 
 
a)  the   scientific   evidence   available 
regarding the dangerousness of the 
substance (available evidence vs. simple 
suspicion); 
b)   the length of time since the first concerns 
about the substance’s dangerousness (30 
years vs. 5 years); 
c)   the   level   of   personal   susceptibility 
(everybody vs. some people); 
d)   the level of consumption (moderate vs. 
immoderate); and 
e)  the current state policy regarding the 
substance: no information campaign and 
free market; no information campaign 
and regulation by the state; information 
campaigns and free market; information 
campaigns and regulation by the state; 
information campaigns and complete 
prohibition. 
 
An example of a story is the following: 
 
Mr. Smith is currently suffering from a severe 
illness, and he is going to die in few weeks 
or  in  few  months.  This  illness  is  due  to 
the consumption of a substance. It has been 
scientifically proved, for more than thirty years 
that the type of substance that Mr. Smith used 
to consume induces, in certain persons with a 
particular sensitivity, this kind of illness. The 
government has not, until now, launched any 
information campaign informing the public of 
the potential dangerousness of the substance. It 
is sold freely, in specialized shops. Mr. Smith 
consumed the substances in a way that can be 
called immoderate. 
The question was, “To what extent do you 
think that the government is partly responsible 
for what has happened to Mr. Smith”? Figure 2 
shows the main findings. The effect of the type 
of policy was strong. Mean responsibility ratings 
were about 10.50 (out of 15) when the sale of 
the substance was regulated by the state (state 
monopoly) and the public was not informed, 10 
when the sale was not regulated by the state 
and the public was not informed, 8 when the 
sale  was  not  regulated  by  the  state  and  the 
public was not informed, 7 when the sale was 
not regulated by the state and the public was 
informed, and only 1.50 when the sale of the 
substance was strictly prohibited and the public 
was informed. More responsibility was attributed 
when scientific evidence was available than 
when it was not, and the two effects interacted. 
The effect of level of consumption (and of the 
two remaining factors) was weaker. 
 
Figure 2 
Perceived government’s responsibility as a 
function of current policy, available scientific 
evidence, and participants’ political orientation 
 
Responsibility ratings are on the vertical axis. 
Current policy is on the horizontal axis (SM 
= No information campaigns and Regulation 
by the state; FM = No information campaigns 
and Free market; SM + Inform = Information 
campaigns and Regulation by the state; FM + 
Inform = Information campaigns and Free market; 
and Prohibition = Information campaigns and 
Prohibition). Each curve corresponds to one level 
of the scientific evidence factor. Each 
panel corresponds to one level of consumption. 
Source: own work 
 
Political orientation had a non-negligible 
impact on responsibility attribution: Left wingers 
attributed more responsibility to the government 
than centrists or right wingers. Also, the effect of 
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scientific evidence was stronger among rightists 
than among centrists or leftists, and the effect 
of state policy was stronger among leftists than 
among centrists or rightists. 
It was only in the case of total prohibition 
that  governments  were  perceived  as  relieved 
of any responsibility. In addition, perceived 
responsibility   was   only   slightly   attenuated 
when systematic information campaigns existed, 
scientific    evidence    was    not    strong,    and 
the persons’ levels of consumption were 
immoderate. Governments, either conservative 
or liberal, have, therefore, well-grounded 
political reasons to maintain and defend 
prohibitive policies regarding certain addictive 
substances. 
People must realize, therefore, that no perfect 
substance policy can exist because policing of 
substances, like many issues in politics, has the 
structure of a dilemma: (a) Either governments 
legalize additional psychoactive substances (e.g., 
cannabis) and they will be held responsible each 
time a user’s health is endangered as a result of 
consumption of this newly legalized substance, 
or (b) governments stick to prohibitive views 
regarding these additional substances and they 
will be held responsible for the violence, health 
consequences (e.g. the propagation of viruses), 
and enforcement costs engendered by the policy 
itself, not only at the national but also at the 
international level. 
Governments’ position can only safely evolve 
from   strict   prohibitive   views   to   regulatory 
views   if   some   conditions   are   fulfilled.   In 
some countries, people, especially leftists, have 
the tendency to attribute responsibility to the 
government  every  time  anything  goes  wrong 
in  society.  Before  a  change  in  policy  can 
be envisioned, people must stop thinking that 
governments are automatically fully responsible 
every time someone’s health deteriorates 
because of the use of illegal substances. 
A change would, furthermore, be more 
acceptable if people would not focus exclusively 
on the local impact of permitting drug use and 
dealing, but would also take into the account 
the national and international consequences of 
prohibiting them. One of them is the elevated 
level of criminal violence drug trade generates 
in affected countries, without mentioning 
corruption at all levels of these societies (Dávila 
Cervantes & Pardo Montaño, 2014). Drawing 
people’s attention from local-scale concerns to 
world-scale concerns might make them more 
demanding towards their governments. A policy 
can only be sustainable, at least for any length 
of time, if it balances the many factors involved 
including public opinion, public health, and 
national and international order (Fetherston & 
Lenton, 2005). Responsibility is a common 
burden. Governments have responsibility for 
their citizens’ health but not to the point that 
citizens can feel relieved of any responsibility. 
Governments have responsibility for their 
citizens’ health but not to the point that they 
should feel relieved of responsibility for foreign 
people’s health and safety. 
 
 
Fairness vs. unfairness: Political 
amnesties during political transition 
 
 
Kpanake   and   Mullet   (2011)   examined   the 
extent to which Togolese people judge political 
amnesties to be acceptable. Amnesties are often 
systematically granted by transitional regimes 
to former perpetrators of violence as a way of 
achieving the shift to democracy. Amnesties, 
however, have a price: They may be viewed 
by  both  victims  and  the  populace  in  general 
as basically unjust, immoral, economically and 
socially inappropriate and even viewed by the 
victims and populace as politically dangerous. 
At the time of the study, Togo was 
experiencing  a  political  transition  after  years 
of presidential dictatorship. In 2008, the new 
president officially announced the creation of a 
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. 
National consultations were launched, and all 
citizens were invited to contribute to the 
implementation of the commission. As a result, 
citizens were sensitized to the issue of political 
amnesties. 
In the study by Kpanake and Mullet (2011), 
351 people aged 18 to 78 were presented with 
48  realistic  vignettes  that  were  composed  by 
Etienne Mullet, Wilson López López, Lonzozou Kpanake, Immaculée Mukashema, Et al. 






orthogonally crossing the levels of five factors 
partly taken from Gibson (2002): 
 
a)  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the 
information that the amnesty applicant 
was willing to reveal (very important 
revelations, some   true   information, 
doubtful information); 
b) the   presence-absence   of   sincere 
apologies (sincere     apologies     and 
demonstration of remorse, no apology 
and no expression of concern for the 
victims); 
c)   the opportunity given to the victims to 
tell their story during the process (full 
opportunity, no real opportunity); 
d)   the   level   of   compensation   for   the 
harm done (reasonable compensation, 
virtually no compensation); and 
e)   the level of punishment of the amnesty 
applicant (loss of job and separation 
from the family, status quo). 
 
An example scenario is the following: 
 
“Paul was the local chief of police and a 
member of the party in power. He was accused 
of personally executing two opponents of the 
regime. In addition, he was also accused of 
having encouraged the people working for him 
to use violence against anyone deemed a threat 
to the power. Paul asked to testify in front of the 
Truth Commission to receive the amnesty that 
the new government had promised to persons 
who agreed to testify openly in front of the 
commission. 
Paul revealed some facts - unknown until 
now - on police activity in his sector and the 
responsibilities of his direct superiors. These 
facts have been verified, and they helped move 
forward the investigation. During the public 
hearings, Paul presented his apologies to the 
victim’s families and all the population of his 
sector. He was very moved, and his apologies 
seemed to be sincere. It even appeared as if Paul 
himself may have been another victim of the 
oppressive regime. 
During the public hearings, the victim’s 
families were able to express their suffering 
openly  and  the  way(s)  that  the  loss  of  two 
of  their  family  members  had  affected  their 
lives. The president of the commission gave 
them enough time to express themselves, and 
the commission showed them respect without 
ever doubting their sincerity. Victims’ families 
received considerable financial compensation. 
They were given the assurance that the basic 
education   of   the   victims’   children   would 
be supported by the government and the 
international non-profit organizations. They 
even   found   a   stable   employment   for   the 
widow of one of the victims. Paul is without 
employment at the present time. His close 
family left him when they learned of his past 
conduct. He is a broken man. Furthermore, he 
had  to  return  all  of  the  possessions  he  had 
stolen in the course of his career to their rightful 
owners.” 
 
The   question   was,   “To   what   extent   do 
you  believe  that  the  amnesty  was  acceptable 
in this case?” Figure 3 illustrates the main 
findings. When no apologies were present, the 
effects of revealing information and opportunity 
to  tell  one’s  story  (as  well  as  the  effects 
of victim’s compensation and the amnesty 
applicant’s suffering) were virtually nil. When 
absolutely  no  truth  was  revealed,  the  effects 
of opportunity to tell one’s story (as well as 
victim’s compensation and amnesty applicant’s 
suffering) were weaker than when the full truth 
was revealed. 
Functional measurement in the field of Ethics in Politics* 








Effect of revealing the truth, perpetrator’s 
apologies and victim’s voice on the 
acceptability of amnesties. In each panel, (a) 
the mean acceptability judgments are on the y- 
axis, (b) the three levels of information/truth 
revealed are on the x-axis, and (c) the two 
curves correspond to the two levels of apologies 
 
Each panel corresponds to one 
level of the victims’ voice factor 
Source: own work 
 
Overall, in only five cases (out of 48) 
acceptability ratings were clearly higher than the 
mid-point of the acceptability scale (>8). For 
the amnesty to be judged acceptable, (a) sincere 
apologies must be present, that is, applicants are 
expected to demonstrate that they have realized 
that their political conduct was wrong; (b) very 
important facts must have been revealed, that is, 
applicants are expected to show their willingness 
to contribute to the truth seeking process; and (c) 
at least two of the other three factors must have 
a positive value (e.g., applicants have personally 
suffered as a result of their misconduct and 
victims have been compensated). The following 
formula summarizes the overall findings: 
Acceptability = (Truth x Apologies) 
(Procedure + Compensation + Punishment) 
The message that was conveyed by the 
Togolese participants was that full compensation 
to the victim is not enough for amnesties to be 
viewed as fair. The only acceptable amnesties 
are the ones that are granted to truly cooperative 
and remorseful applicants, with the additional 
requirement that the victims be properly if not 
fully compensated. The implications of these 
findings are straightforward. Each time amnesty 
is granted to former members of undemocratic 
regimes who are perceived by the people as 
unrepentant  murderers  who  still  feel  justified 
in behaving the way they did, the amnesty 
process is bound to be perceived as unacceptable 
(Wilson, 2001). 
Of course, most people can understand that 
an amnesty process can ease political transition 
because powerful members of the old regime 
are often able to block indefinitely the process 
to democracy if they have no strong assurances 
that their fortune and their freedom will be 
untouched (Gibson, 2004). As a result, people 
can, at least temporarily, agree with an amnesty 
process because they perceive it as a political 
necessity. In the long run, however, once the 
power of the amnestied person has faded, the 
legitimacy of the amnesty process is in danger of 
being strongly questioned. 
 
 
Fairness vs. unfairness: Attribution of 
guilt to offspring of perpetrators of the 
genocide against Tutsi 
 
 
Mukashema and Mullet (2015) examined the 
attribution of guilt to offspring of people who 
were directly involved in the genocide against 
the  Tutsi  in  Rwanda:  To  what  extent  can 
the son or grandson of a small farmer who 
participated in the genocide be considered as 
guilty of his father’s or grandfather’s deeds? This 
question is an important one because it has many 
implications for daily life in Rwanda and for 
the future of the country. In this tiny country, 
former victims and victims’ offspring and former 
perpetrators and perpetrators’ offspring live and 
work in the same villages or in the same 
boroughs. Many of them know each other very 
well, they go to the same markets and they 
attend the same religious celebrations in the same 
churches. If guilt were to be attributed on an 
associative basis, all victims would be entitled 
to consider all the members of the group that 
perpetrated the genocide — elderly people, adult 
people,  adolescents,  child,  infants,  and  even 
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babies to be born— as guilty. At least some 
of them would feel justified in taking revenge 
on these young people. The situation would 
probably be untenable. 
In the study by Mukashema and Mullet 
(2015),  55  participants  aged  18  to  61,  all 
of  them  coming  from  the  group  targeted  by 
the genocide, were presented with 24 realistic 
vignettes composed by orthogonally crossing the 
levels of two factors: 
 
a)   the  target  for  the  attribution  of  guilt 
(either the actor or the actor’s son), and 
b)   the level of involvement in the genocide 
(state official who planned the genocide 
and killing; state official who planned 
the genocide but did not participate; 
officer organizing the massacres locally 
and    killing    people    as    a    matter 
of example; civil servant willingly 
killing family members; small farmer 
killing family members under officers’ 
supervision; small farmer killing other 
people than family members; small 
farmer hurting people; truck driver 
informing   the   killers;   supporter   of 
the genocide living abroad; supporter 
who did not participate; opponent who 
remained a passive bystander; opponent 
who actively saved lives and was hurt). 
 
An example of scenario is the following: 
 
Rafayire M. was born in 1990. His father was a 
small farmer. His father was not a supporter 
of the government because he disagreed with 
the discrimination and the invitation to violence. 
He refused to take part in the killings. He, 
however, never interposed himself between 
killers and victims. Rafayire’s father did not 
publicly condemn the genocide, and he did not 
try to hide or help the persons targeted. He 
remained a passive bystander. 
 
The question was, “What is, from your 
personal viewpoint, the level of guilt that must 
be  attributed  to  this  person?”  As  we  wanted 
to separate neatly the participants who would 
attribute guilt from the others, we performed a 
cluster analysis. Figure 4 shows the two-cluster 
solution that was retained. The first cluster was 
called Some Intergenerational Transmission of 
Guilt because the ratings of guilt attributed to 
offspring were higher than zero, and depended on 
level of father’s involvement. The level of guilt 
attributed (a) to people who participated in the 
killings, simply supported the idea of genocide, 
or did nothing to help the victims was always 
very high, ranging from approximately 8 to 10, 
and (b) to opponents who saved lives was nil. 
The second, majority cluster was called No 
Intergenerational Transmission of Guilt because 
the ratings of guilt attributed to offspring were 
always close to zero. The level of guilt attributed 
(a) to people who participated in the killings 
either directly or indirectly (e.g. informers) was 
very high, ranging from approximately 8 to 10; 
(b) to people who did not kill (e.g., simply hurt 
without killing or supported the genocide) was 
high, ranging from approximately 6 to 7.5; (c) to 
passive bystanders was relatively low, although 
not nil (approximately 3); and (d) to opponents 
who saved lives was nil. 
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Patterns of results corresponding to the two 
clusters: Some Transmission of Guilt and No 
Transmission of Guilt 
 
In each panel, the mean guilt judgments are on 
the y-axis, the levels of involvement are on the x- 
axis, and the target of judgments corresponds to 
the two curves. AO = opponent of the genocide 
who actively saved lives and was hurt; PO = 
opponent who remained a passive bystander; 
Supp. = supporter who did not participate; SA 
= supporter of the genocide living abroad; I&B 
= truck driver who informed the killers; FH = 
small farmer who hurt people; FK = small farmer 
who killed other people than family members; 
FKF = small farmer who killed family members 
under officers’ supervision; CVKF = civil servant 
who willingly killed family members; O&K 
= officer who organized the massacres locally 
and killed people as a matter of example; Plan 
= state official who planned the genocide but did 
not participate; P&K = state official who 
planned the genocide and participated in killings 
Source: own work 
 
The majority position was, therefore, that 
offspring, owing to their non-participation in the 
genocide, were totally free of guilt. This position 
has been incorporated in most penal codes 
around the world, and it is, logically, the official 
position of Rwanda’s government at least since 
the end of the genocide. The minority position 
was that perpetrators’ offspring inherited at least 
part of their genitors’ guilt, especially if their 
fathers were state officials who deliberately 
planned the genocide. No guilt was, however, 
transferred if the father or the grandfather did 
not kill anybody. The existence of only a small 
cluster of participants sharing the transmission 
of guilt view was consistent with most previous 
field studies showing that feeling or expression 
of collective guilt is not a frequent phenomenon 
(Leach,  Bou  Zeineddine,  &  #ehaji#-Clancy, 
2012). 
Non-attribution of guilt to offspring of 
perpetrators was, in our view, not simply legalist 
thinking, but also adaptive thinking. From an 
historical perspective, we are all currently alive 
because we are survivors of previous conflicts. 
We have survived because our direct ancestors 
were able successfully to attack and despoil 
other people, and/or because our ancestors were 
able to resist, through bloody fights, other 
groups’ attacks, and/or because our ancestors 
preferred not to take sides in conflicts in which 
other people were victimized. If guilt had to 
be attributed not only on an individual basis 
(“objective” guilt) but also on an associative 
basis, all of us would be, by intergenerational 
transmission, guilty of thousands of previous 
crimes and injustices committed by our direct 
ancestors since the dawn of Homo sapiens. 
Exonerating perpetrators’ offspring of 
personal guilt is certainly the most reasonable 
thing  to  do,  even  if  it  may  be  shocking 
from  a  moral  perspective  centered  on  the 
here  and  now.  It  allows  all  of  us  to  live 
without  the  unbearable  burden  of  culpability 
that would be associated with humanity’s 
struggle  for  life  since  time  immemorial  and, 
at  the  same  time,  it  denies  the  possibility 
that revenge can legitimately be exacted (or 
worse, should be exacted) on perpetrators’ 
offspring.  It  does  not  dispense  us,  however, 
from acknowledging (a) that wrongs have been 
committed, (b) that perpetrators’ offspring have 
a special duty towards people their ancestors 
have recently wronged, and (c) that everybody 
– victims’ offspring, perpetrators’ offspring, and 
bystanders – must work to prevent such wrongs 
from reoccurring in the future. 
Trying to persuade people that, whether they 
like it or not, they share their ancestor’s guilt is 
likely to make most of them feel more defensive 
and less collaborative. Leading people to think 
that, although there is no basis for holding them 
personally guilty, they should do something to 
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repair what has been done by their ancestors is 
likely to make most of them feel less defensive 
and more collaborative. 
 
 
Fairness vs. unfairness: Slave 
descendants’ views regarding national 
policies on reparation 
 
 
Armange and Mullet (2016) examined the 
acceptability to people whose families had been 
directly affected by slavery of possible national 
policies on reparations for slavery. For four 
centuries, African people living in West Africa 
were regularly transported as cargo by European 
traders to South America, the Caribbean Islands, 
and North America . It is estimated that at least 
twelve million people were purchased from local 
leaders in Western Africa and shipped through 
the  Atlantic  (Quirk,  2014).  Although  slavery 
was abolished during the nineteenth century, 
reparation for slavery is still a debated issue. 
Slave  owners  were  compensated  for  the  loss 
of their slaves. For example, when the decree 
of abolition was passed in 1833, the British 
government disbursed the equivalent of $125 
billion (current value in 2016) to compensate 
3,000 slave-owning families. In contrast, slave 
workers have, until now, never been materially 
compensated, even though the program of 
“affirmative action” launched in 1961 under the 
presidency of John Kennedy in the US could, 
according to some authors (McWhorter, 2001), 
be seen as a form of compensation. 
The study by Armange and Mullet (2016) 
focused on French slave descendants’ views, and 
five possible national policies were considered: 
 
a)   a  policy  of  full  acknowledgement  by 
the state’s government of the tragedy of 
slavery and formal apologies offered by 
elected officials to the victims of slavery, 
b)   a   policy   of   material   compensation 
of the victims of slavery without 
acknowledgment by the government of 
the tragedy of slavery and without 
formal apologies, 
c)   a policy combining (a) and (b), 
d)   a policy of complete amnesia, and 
e)   a     policy     of     exaltation     of     the 
country’s colonial past, associated with 
public declarations about the positive 
contribution of former colonists. 
 
Two hundred ninety-eight participants, living 
on the French island of Martinique, aged 18-80, 
were presented with a set of 40 vignettes 
composed by orthogonally crossing the levels of 
four factors: 
 
a) the percentage of slave descendants 
currently living in the country affected 
by the policy (20% vs. 1%) 
b) the percentage of slave descendants 
currently living in the country affected 
by the policy (20% vs. 1%); 
c) the level of their current economic 
integration (not well integrated vs. well 
integrated); 
d) the  level  of  their  current  social 
integration (not well integrated vs. well 
integrated); and 
e)  the current state policy regarding past 
colonization and slavery in the country 
(see above). 
 
An example of a vignette is the following: 
 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, rich 
landowners in the country acquired slaves 
coming  from  Western  Africa.  These  slaves 
were  freed  during  the  19
th   
century.  Most 
of  them  stayed  and  made  their  living  in 
the country. Nowadays, their descendants are 
several thousand people. They represent about 
one percent of the population in the country. 
Economically speaking, they are now well 
integrated into the production system. Their 
standard  of  living  is,  on  average,  similar  to 
that of the other inhabitants. They are vibrant 
and they have access to education and health 
care to the same extent as the other citizens. 
Socially speaking, they have never mixed with 
the rest of the population. They have not had 
incentives to do so. Few mixed marriages have 
been recorded. They live in their community. 
The  country’s  government  has 
acknowledged the responsibility of the state 
regarding the colonial past of the country and 
the tragedy of slavery. Public apologies have 
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been publicly offered to slave descendants. In 
addition, this colonial past is not, in the media 
or at school, presented in a positive light to the 
young generations. 
 
The   question   was   “To   what   extent   do 
you consider that such a national policy in 
acceptable?” Figure 5 shows the main results 




Acceptability of national policy as a function of 
type of national policy and social integration 
 
The three panels correspond to the three clusters: 
Skeptics, Reparationists, and Undetermined . In 
each panel, the mean acceptability judgments 
are on the y-axis, the types of policy are on 
the x-axis, and the four levels formed by the 
two integration factors correspond to the four 
curves. Exalt. = Exaltation of the colonial 
past; Amnes = Political Amnesia; Repar. = 
Reparations without acknowledgment; Ackn 
= Acknowledgment without reparations; and 
A & R = Acknowledgment and reparations. 
Source: own work 
 
The first cluster was called Skeptics because 
the overall mean rating was notably and 
significantly lower than the middle of the 
response scale. It is only when full integration 
was achieved that the two acknowledgement 
policies  were  considered  as  tolerable  if  not 
fully acceptable: The two means were close to 
the middle of the response scale. The second 
cluster was called Reparationists because ratings 
were distributed all over the response scale, and 
the national policy factor had a stronger effect 
than  in  the  other  two  clusters.  In  particular, 
acceptability was the highest when the state’s 
policy was one of full acknowledgement and 
reparation (about 10). It was progressively lower 
when  the  policy  was  acknowledgment  with 
no attempt at reparation (about 8), reparation 
without full acknowledgment (about 5), amnesia 
(about 3) or presentation of the colonial past in 
a positive light (about 2.50). In addition, when 
economic and social integration was achieved, 
the effect of national policy was stronger than 
when they were not achieved. The third cluster 
was called Undetermined because the responses 
were always close to the center of the response 
scale and the effects of the factors were weak. 
Participants with only primary or secondary 
education, and who were regular attendees at 
church were more frequently members of this 
third cluster and less frequently members of the 
other two clusters than other participants were. 
The existence of such an undetermined position 
is consistent with findings from previous studies 
on complex societal issues that allowed people to 
express an absence of position (see Neto et al., 
2013). 
Although slave descendants living on 
Martinique differed considerably in their views 
about the relevance and/or acceptability of 
national policies of reparation for slavery, they 
agreed on one important point: For a national 
policy  to  be  acceptable,  or at  least  tolerable, 
it must involve public acknowledgment of past 
wrongs. For some people (35% in the present 
sample), a national policy that includes public 
acknowledgment of past wrongs was considered 
as  acceptable,  whether  it  is  accompanied  by 
a policy of material compensation or not, and 
more so if socio-economic integration has been 
achieved. For others (28%), a national policy that 
includes public acknowledgment of past wrongs 
was considered as tolerable if it is accompanied 
by material compensation and provided that 
socio-economic integration has been achieved. 
In no case was a policy of material compensation 
not accompanied by public acknowledgment of 
past wrongs considered as acceptable, even if full 
socio-economic integration has been achieved. 
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Loyalty vs. betrayal: Forgiving known 




López López et al. (2012) examined Colombian 
people’s positions regarding the granting of 
forgiveness  to  persons  who  have  been  more 
or less actively involved in the violence that 
ravaged the country during the past 60 years. 
More specifically, they examined whether, as 
member of a family that has been directly 
affected by violence, it was viewed as acceptable 
to forgive, under a set of different conditions, a 
known perpetrator. 
In  the  aftermath  of  civil  wars,  countries 
face the daunting task of rebuilding themselves 
on better foundations. They must rebuild not 
only   their   material   infrastructure   but   also 
their societal and psychological infrastructure. 
Although reestablishing trust and cooperation 
between former enemies may sometimes seem 
impossible, it is, nevertheless, a necessary 
objective. The spirit of revenge, enduring 
resentment, and lasting dissensions between 
groups can only generate a deleterious social 
climate, a climate that is certainly not propitious 
to innovation, economic development, and 
prosperity (Cotte Poveda, 2012). 
The    study    by    López    López    et    al. 
(2012) focused on the considerable individual 
differences in willingness to forgive already 
reported in previous literature and on the impact 
of concrete circumstances such as the presence 
of apologies from the perpetrator. Four hundred 
participants living in Bogota, aged 18-55, were 
presented with 48 scenarios composed by the 
orthogonal crossing of three factors: 
 
a)  the  level  of  involvement  in  the 
violence (organizer, executor, or passive 
bystander); 
b)   the  level  of  severity  of  the  negative 
act committed (murder, kidnapping, 
destruction of property or torture or 
threat, and theft); 
c)   the   level   of   apologies   offered   by 
the perpetrator     (no     apology     at 
all,  acknowledgment  of  responsibility, 
begging forgiveness, and begging 
forgiveness and offering reparation). 
 
A between-subject factor was also introduced 
in the study: the actors’ identity (member of the 
guerilla, paramilitary, military, and drug dealer). 
An example of a scenario is the following: 
 
Luis Ramos is a former member of the 
guerrillas.   He   was   the   author   of   several 
violent acts. He killed a total of five persons, 
including Enrique Garciía, an ordinary citizen. 
These violent acts had been planned by Luis’ 
superiors. He only obeyed orders. Currently, 
Luis wishes to reintegrate himself to civil 
society. He has, however, never presented 
himself to the Garcia family with the intention 
of begging forgiveness. (López López et al., 
2012) 
 
The question was: “If you were a member 
of  the  Garcia  family,  to  what  extent  would 
you be willing to forgive him?” A four-cluster 
solution  was  retained.  Figure  6  shows  the 
main findings. The majority position was called 
“Never Forgive”. Overall, willingness to forgive 
was low irrespective of the circumstances. This 
strictly unforgiving attitude was shared by a 
majority of participants from the wealthiest 
social  class,  and  by  more  than  forty  percent 
of the participants from the other classes, with 
the exception of the poorest one. It was also 
much more frequently observed in the guerilla, 
military,  and  drug  dealer  conditions  than  in 
the paramilitary condition. Until recently, this 
no-forgiveness position was the government’s 
official position towards the guerillas and their 
associates (Borja Orozco, Barreto, Sabucedo, & 
López López, 2008). 
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Main results for each of the four clusters: 
Never Forgive, Hesitant, Depending on 
Circumstances,  and Always forgive 
 
In each panel, the mean willingness to forgive 
judgments is on the y-axis, the perpetrator’s 
behaviors are on the x-axis, and the four 
curves correspond to the severity of the 
negative acts. Resp = Acknowledgment 
of responsibility; Apolog. = Presence of 
sincere apologies; A&C = Presence of sincere 
apologies and offering of compensation. 
Source: own work 
 
The  second  position  was  called  “Hesitant 
to  forgive”.  Overall,  willingness  to  forgive 
was somewhat higher than in the first cluster. 
For  these  participants,  fully  forgiving  would 
be difficult. The effects of responsibility, 
severity, and apologies were weak. This hesitant 
attitude was more frequent among people from 
the middle-class than among others. Several 
participants stated, after having responded to all 
the scenarios, that personally they thought that, at 
least in some cases, forgiveness could be granted, 
but that, as this view conflicted with the one 
advocated by the authorities, they were very 
hesitant about the issue. 
The  third  position  was  called  “Depending 
on Circumstances”. Overall, willingness to 
forgive  was  relatively  high,  and  the  effects 
of responsibility, severity, and apologies were 
strong and interacted, which indicates that the 
judgment process was a complex one. This 
complex attitude was more frequent among 
people from the poorest classes than among those 
from the wealthiest classes. It was also much 
more frequent in the paramilitary condition than 
in the others. 
The fourth position was called “Always 
forgive”. Overall, willingness to forgive was 
very high. The effects of responsibility, severity, 
and apologies were weak. This forgiving 
attitude, like the preceding one, was more 
frequently observed among people from the 
poorest classes than among those from the 
wealthiest classes. 
A large segment of the Colombian society 
(about 30%) seems to be undecided about the 
proper conduct towards ex-members of the 
groups responsible for violence. If national 
reconciliation truly becomes an element of the 
nation’s political agenda, it is probable that these 
persons  would  shift  their  attitude  and  adopt 
the “Depending on circumstances” position. If 
this  were  the  case,  a  majority  of  the  people 
in Colombia would be of the view that, under 
some circumstances, the members of the groups 
that were responsible for violence could be 
forgiven. Such a shift could considerably ease 
reconciliation (and reinsertion). 
 
 
Authority vs. subversion: Citizens’ 
positions regarding national policies 
about illicit drugs 
 
 
Camus, Muñoz Sastre, Sorum, & Mullet (2014) 
examined French people’s positions regarding 
actual and potential national drug policies. 
Goode (1998, p. 19) identified five “high- 
profile” views about drug policies, which are 
endorsed by different groups of people he called: 
“cultural conservatives, free trade libertarians, 
radical constructionists, progressive legalizers, 
and  progressive  prohibitionists”.  In  the  past, 
the free trade libertarian view dominated drug 
policies  in  most  countries.  In  the  US  until 
1914, for example, the drug market was not 
regulated, and a non-negligible segment of the 
population used opium and heroin. Currently, it 
is the cultural conservative, prohibitionist view 
that  dictates  drug  policies  in  the  US  as  well 
as in most countries. The current drug policy 
in the Netherlands is, however, consistent with 
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the  progressive  legalizers’  view.  Since  1976, 
soft drugs (e.g., marijuana) are sold and can be 
consumed in coffee shops all around the country. 
Hard drugs are illegal but drug abusers are not 
harshly prosecuted. Furthermore, the drug policy 
since 1991 in Switzerland is consistent with the 
progressive prohibitionists’ view. Soft drugs are 
still illegal but their consumption is de facto 
tolerated, and treatment-resistant heroin addicts 
are provided with controlled prescriptions of 
heroin or maintenance substances. Mexico 
adopted a similar policy in 2009. 
Knowing people’s views about drug policies 
(current and alternative) is important for several 
reasons. Most people are voters; they can 
support or not support candidates and political 
parties  as  a  function,  among  other  things,  of 
the drug policy advocated by these candidates 
and political parties. In addition, many people 
are potential drug consumers, and as such they 
may  decide  to  respect  current  laws  or  break 
them as a function of their views regarding the 
laws’ perceived appropriateness. Finally, some 
people are in between the law and the consumers 
(policemen, judges, lawyers). If they strongly 
agree with the current drug policy, they will 
tend to pursue lawbreakers actively and sentence 
them  according  to  the  provisions  of  laws.  If 
they do not completely agree with the current 
policy, they will tend to be lenient and look 
systematically for extenuating circumstances. 
In the study by Camus et al. (2014), 200 
participants, aged 18-81, were presented with 
24 vignettes that were composed according to a 
three within-subject orthogonal factor design: 
 
a)   the demand for drugs in the country (low 
vs. high); 
b)   the information campaigns regarding the 
dangerousness of drugs (existent vs. 
absent); 
c)   the current state policy regarding soft 
and  hard  drugs  (“laissez-faire”  policy 
for both soft and hard drugs; strict 
prohibition of both soft and hard drugs; 
regulation of both soft and hard drugs; 
regulation   of   soft   drugs   and   strict 
prohibition  of  hard  drugs;  and  three 
intermediate policies). 
 
An example of scenario is the following: 
 
South-Calgony   is   a   small   republic   of   10 
million  inhabitants.  In  South-Calgony,  as  in 
the neighboring countries, there is a certain 
domestic demand for soft drugs and for hard 
drugs. The State has, many times in the past, 
launched  campaigns  to  warn  people  about 
the dangers associated with using drugs. The 
teaching of the risks associated with drug 
consumption has been made compulsory in all 
schools and public institutions. On the one 
hand, the State has decided to regulate the sale 
of soft drugs and to ensure their production 
and distribution. On the other hand, the State 
has  decided  to  prohibit  completely  the  sale 
of hard drugs and to prosecute traffickers. As 
a result, soft drugs are sold correctly packed 
up, with exact dosages, in stores controlled by 
the State. Their price is certainly high but not 
prohibitive, so much so that the traffickers have 
had to give up this market. Hard drugs, in 
contrast, are sold clandestinely. Their price is 
prohibitive and the associated profits generate 
a certain level of corruption at the very heart 
of the state and a level of homicides that 
remains fortunately moderate. The quality of 
soft drugs is guaranteed. The quality of hard 
drugs is highly variable, and many accidents 
(accidental overdoses) are reported each year. 
(López López et al. (2012) 
 
The question was “To what extent do you 
think that, in these circumstances, the position 
of the State is politically acceptable?” A three- 
cluster  solution  was  found.  Figure  7  shows 
the   main   findings.   The   first   position   was 
called “Radical Constructionists” because there 
was  no  drug  policy  that  was  considered  as 
truly acceptable,; that is, the mean ratings of 
acceptability were all very low. 
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Acceptability of policy as a function of type 
of drug policy and the presence-absence of 
information campaigns about the dangers of 
drugs 
 
In each panel, the mean acceptability judgments 
are on the y-axis, the types of policy are on the 
x-axis, and the two curves correspond to the 
presence/absence of information campaigns. 
LF = “laissez faire” policy; R = Regulate; P 
= Prohibit; S = Soft drugs; H = Hard drugs 
Source: own work 
 
The second position was called 
“Prohibitionists” because the only acceptable 
policy was complete prohibition with the 
condition that information campaigns about the 
dangers  of  drugs  would  be  conducted.  The 
effect of the drug policy factor was strong; the 
highest acceptability values were observed for 
Complete Prohibition (about 6), Prohibition of 
Hard Drugs and Regulation of Soft Drugs (about 
4), and Prohibition of Hard drugs (about 3). The 
effect of the information factor was also strong; 
when information campaigns were conducted, all 
acceptability responses were higher (especially 
in the case of complete prohibition) than when 
no information campaigns were conducted. 
The third position was called “Regulationists” 
because the only acceptable drug policy was 
Complete Regulation with the condition that 
information campaigns about the dangers of 
drugs would be conducted. As in the preceding 
case,  the  effect  of  the  drug  policy  factor 
was  strong;  the  highest  acceptability  values 
were observed for Complete Regulation (about 
7), Regulation of Hard Drugs (about 5), and 
Prohibition of Hard drugs and Regulation of Soft 
Drugs (about 5). The effect of the information 
factor was also strong. 
Unexpectedly, participants did not seem to 
make strong distinctions between policies for 
soft and hard drugs. They judged either complete 
regulation or complete prohibition as the most 
acceptable policy, and they never considered 
“mixed” policies (e.g., regulation of soft drugs 
associated with prohibition of hard drugs) as 
more acceptable than policies that treated soft 
and  hard  drugs  in  the  same  way.  In  other 
words, both views reflected global attitudes 
about  drugs:  Accordingly,  one  should  expect 
that (a) people who believe strongly that hard 
drugs should be prohibited will not be persuaded 
easily that soft drugs should not be prohibited, 
and b) people who believe strongly that soft 
drugs should be regulated, rather than prohibited, 
will not be persuaded easily that hard drugs 
should be prohibited rather than regulated. Also, 
even if prohibitionists as well as regulationists 
were sensitive to the importance of information 
campaigns about the dangers of using drugs, their 
positions did not seem to be influenced by the 
size of the current drug market in the depicted 
country. 
The present study has implications for 
decision-makers. It shows that, in France, there 
may be a large segment of the population that 
would, under certain conditions, favor a change 
in current legislation about drugs. As decision- 
makers  are,  understandably,  always  reluctant 
to propose radical changes regarding sensitive 
issues fearing being disavowed by their voters 
or blamed for future problems (UK Drug Policy 
Commission, 2012, see also Camus et al., 2016 
above), this finding may be of interest. In 
addition, the study shows that another segment 
of the population tends to think that the issue is 
not about policing (radical constructionists). If, 
however, convincing evidence-based proposals 
were presented, these people could adopt the 
view that, although there are undoubtedly 
biological, psychological, and societal factors 
implied in drug use, policing is still an important 
issue. 
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The main findings from this study have been 
replicated by López López et al. (2016b) on a 
sample of Colombian adults: The five positions 
advocated by Goode (1998) were empirically 
found,; that is, a free trade libertarian position 
and a progressive prohibitionist position were 
found in addition to the three positions found by 
Camus et al. (2014). 
 
 
Disgust vs. purity: Rape, murder, 
recidivism, and the appropriateness of 
the death penalty 
 
 
Kamble and Mullet (2016) examined the 
personal positions of Indian students regarding 
the appropriateness of the death penalty overall 
and the importance of various circumstances 
when judging its appropriateness. The death 
penalty is the legal process by which a defendant 
is put to death by an official court of justice. 
About sixty per cent of the world's population, 
among them the citizens of China, India, 
Indonesia, and the USA, live in countries where 
the death penalty is part of the law and executions 
take place. In 2013, it was estimated that about 
500 persons have been sentenced to death in 
India, among them 60 in the state of Karnataka, 
the state with the highest percentage of convicts 
on death row in the Union. The types of criminals 
that, according to the Supreme Court of India, 
can be sentenced to death are (a) large scale 
drug traffickers who are recidivists; (b) armed 
rebels  fighting  against  the  Union,  terrorists, 
and mutineers; (c) persons who have assisted 
non-autonomous persons to kill themselves; (d) 
rapists whose victims are left in a vegetative 
state; (e) gang robbers indirectly involved in 
killings; and (f) murderers (including people 
having committed an honor killing or policemen 
who have committed encounter killings). 
In the study by Kamble and Mullet (2016), 
430 unpaid students from the Hindu community, 
aged about 22-23 and enrolled at Karnatak 
University, were presented with 48 vignettes that 
were composed by orthogonally crossing the 
levels of five factors: 
a)  the type of crime imputed to the 
defendant (burglary, rape, or homicide); 
b) whether culpability has been fully 
demonstrated or not; 
c)   whether the defendant showed signs of 
empathy/compassion for the victim or 
the victim’s relatives; 
d)   whether the defendant was a recidivist or 
not; and 
e)   the level of criminality in the area (low 
vs. high). 
 
An example of a scenario is the following: 
 
Miten  Badigera  has  been  arrested  for  rape 
by the police. Rape is a relatively frequent 
offense in this state. The statistics are alarming. 
It is the second time that Miten Badigera has 
been arrested for rape. He has already been 
incarcerated. Miten Badigera’s culpability has 
not, in this case, been fully established. During 
the trial, the defendant neither showed any 
indication of empathy with/compassion for the 
victim’s relatives nor expressed any form of 
repentance. 
 
The question was: To what extend do you 
consider that the death penalty would be an 
appropriate penalty in such a case?” A six-cluster 
solution  was  found.  The  first  cluster  (20%) 
was called “Type of Crime” because this factor 
was clearly the dominant one: Appropriateness 
was judged much higher in the case of rape 
(about 8) or homicide (about 6.5), than in the 
case of burglary (about 2.5). Overall, the death 
penalty was judged fully appropriate (rating 
higher than 8) only in cases of rape when 
culpability was demonstrated and the defendant 
was  a  recidivist.  The  second  cluster  (21%) 
was called “Culpability”: the death penalty was 
judged more appropriate when culpability was 
fully demonstrated (about 8) than when it was 
not (about 4.5). Overall, the death penalty was 
judged fully appropriate in no less than 15 out 
of the 48 scenarios, namely (a) in cases of rape 
when culpability was demonstrated; (b) in cases 
of murder when culpability was demonstrated 
and empathy was absent; (c) in cases of murder 
when culpability was demonstrated and the 
defendant  was  a  recidivist;  and  (d)  in  cases 
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of burglary when culpability was demonstrated, 
empathy was absent, the defendant was a 
recidivist, and the local statistics of criminality 
were high. 
The   third   cluster,   the   relative   majority 
cluster  (31%),  was  called  “Type  of  Crime 
and Culpability” because it combined features 
from the first two clusters. Overall, the death 
penalty was judged fully appropriate in five 
scenarios, namely (a) in cases of rape or murder 
when culpability was demonstrated, empathy 
was absent, and the defendant was a recidivist; 
and (b) in cases of murder when culpability was 
demonstrated, empathy was absent, and the local 
statistics of criminality were high. 
The fourth cluster (8%) was called “Empathy/ 
Compassion”: the death penalty was judged 
more appropriate when no empathy/compassion 
in the defendant was perceptible (about 6) than 
when  it  was  perceptible  (about  3).  Overall, 
the death penalty was judged fully appropriate 
in only one scenario, namely in the case of 
murder when culpability was demonstrated, 
empathy was not perceptible, the defendant was 
a recidivist, and the local statistics of criminality 
were high. 
The fifth cluster (5%) was called 
“Recidivism”: The death penalty was judged 
more appropriate when the defendant was a 
recidivist (about 8) than when he was not (about 
3.5). Overall, the death penalty was judged fully 
appropriate in eleven scenarios, namely (a) in 
the  case  of  murder  or  rape  when  culpability 
was demonstrated and the defendant was a 
recidivist; (b) in the case of murder or rape when 
no empathy was perceptible and the defendant 
was a recidivist; and (c) in cases of burglary 
when culpability was demonstrated, empathy 
was absent, and the defendant was a recidivist, 
the local statistics of criminality were high. 
Finally, the sixth cluster (15%) was called 
“Almost Always Appropriate” because mean 
ratings were much higher than in the other 
clusters (about 7.5). In fact, the death penalty 
was judged fully appropriate in no less than 20 
scenarios, namely (a) in cases of rape or murder 
when culpability was demonstrated; (b) in cases 
of rape or murder when culpability was not fully 
demonstrated but the defendant was a recidivist; 
and (c) in cases of burglary when culpability 
was demonstrated, empathy was absent, and the 
defendant was a recidivist. 
Overall, (a) females’ ratings were higher than 
males’ ratings but this difference was limited to 
the case of rape; (b) physical science students’ 
ratings were higher than social science students’ 
ratings;  and  (c)  culpability  had  more  impact 
and empathy/compassion less impact on ratings 
among physical science students than among 
social science students. 
Support for the death penalty was relatively 
high,   which   was   consistent   with   findings 
from previous studies (Lambert, Pasupuleti, 
Jiang, Jaishankar, & Bhimarasetty, 2008). Most 
university students from Karnataka do not appear 
to be opposed systematically to the death penalty, 
and the most important factors for judging the 
appropriateness of the death penalty were type of 
crime, culpability, and recidivism. The relative 
importance of these factors did not vary much as 
a function of gender or of previous experience of 
victimization but varied as a function of field of 
study. 
If  students  largely  agreed  with  the  view 
that  the  death  penalty  is  in  some  situations 
an appropriate punishment, they differed 
considerably in the extent of these situations. 
For   a   relative   majority   of   them,   for   the 
death penalty to be considered appropriate, the 
defendant’s culpability must be demonstrated 
and the defendant is a recidivist who is unable 
to demonstrate any empathy. By contrast, for a 
minority of them, death penalty was viewed as 
appropriate even in cases where culpability has 
not been fully demonstrated. 
 
 
Disgust   vs.   purity:   Threat,   bribery, 




López López et al. (2016a) examined Colombian 
lay persons’ views regarding a number of 
behaviors of officials, entrepreneurs, or ordinary 
citizens that are usually considered as corrupt. 
Among   Colombians,   and   especially   among 
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people living in Bogota, corruption recently 
became an increasing concern. In 2011, it ranked 
third after violence and unemployment (Latin 
America  Public  Opinion  Project,  Colombia, 
2011). In Bogota, 20% of people identified 
corruption as the highest concern in the country. 
As  shown  in  previous  studies  (e.g.,  Gong 
&  Wang,  2013),  most  people  most  of  the 
time express intolerance to corruption when the 
consequences of corruption are perceived as 
severe (e.g., vote-buying by politicians during 
elections). As has also been found, however, a 
minority of people in a minority of situations 
express surprisingly high levels of tolerance to 
corruption, above all when the consequences are 
perceived as not very severe (e.g., using one’s 
network of political connections to help a friend 
to find a job). 
To  fully  understand  this  phenomenon  and 
the diversity of reactions it produces among 
people, it is useful to frame it in the larger 
context of humanization,; that is, to see it as the 
result of a conflict between two kinds of ethics 
that separately developed as human became 
“civilized”, each one based on its own rationale: 
tribal ethics and modern ethics (Fox, 2011). 
Tribal ethics is defined in terms of the tribe’s 
survival and growth; it demands that powerful 
people take more care of their relatives – the 
extended family – than of unknown people. In 
most cases, perceived corruption results when 
tribal ethics has been applied (e.g., recruiting a 
relative) in cases in which most people expect 
modern ethics to be applied (e.g., organizing 
a  public  contest,  Newell,  2008).  The  inverse 
is also true. There are no few cases in which 
the application of modern ethics (e.g., signaling 
cases of abuses by the police, providing health 
care to foreigners) is denounced as severe lack 
of solidarity with colleagues or with countrymen 
(the loyalty foundation in MFT), or as political 
weakness by people who consider that only tribal 
ethics is appropriate in those cases (Ivkovi# & 
Sauerman, 2015). 
In the study by López López et al. (2016a), 413 
participants, aged 18-69, and living in different 
areas of the city of Bogota, were presented with a 
set of 24 vignettes composed according to a three 
within-subject orthogonal factor design: 
 
a)   the current status or position in society 
of the person who behaved in a corrupt 
way (politician, judge, entrepreneur, or 
ordinary citizen); 
b)   the motive behind the act of corruption 
(nepotism or monetary gain); and 
c) the means used for obtaining the 
underserved benefit (threatening the 
person, bribery, or illicitly sharing of 
confidential information). 
 
An example of a scenario is the following: 
 
“Herman is a senator. He wishes his nephew 
to get a civil servant position in the Ministry 
of Health. His nephew has currently been 
unemployed for two years. Fifty candidates 
have already been pre-selected for this position. 
As  Herman  has  a  good  friend  among  the 
people  in  the  Ministry  responsible  for  the 
final examination, he has been able to obtain 
information regarding the questionnaires that 
are going to be used during the process of 
selection. Herman decides to communicate this 
information to his nephew. His nephew uses the 
information, succeeds in the competition, and 
gets the position.” 
 
The question was “To what extent do you 
think that, in these circumstances, the senator’s 
behavior is tolerable?” A four-cluster solution 
was found, and its main results are shown in 
Figure 8. 
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Judged tolerability of behavior as a function 
of current status or position in society of the 
person who behaved in a corrupt way and 
means used for obtaining the underserved 
benefit 
 
In each panel, the mean tolerability judgments are 
on the y-axis, and the three levels of severity of 
the negative act are on the x-axis. The four curves 
correspond to the social position of the person 
Source: own work 
 
The first cluster was called Zero Tolerance 
because in absolutely all cases, the ratings were 
extremely close to the left end of the response 
scale. The second cluster was called Never Very 
Tolerable because the ratings, although always 
closer  to  the  left  end  than  to  the  right  end 
of the response scale, varied as a function of 
the means used: Threat and bribery (about 1.5) 
were considered as more intolerable than use 
of information (about 3). The third cluster was 
called Depends on Means because, as in the 
preceding case, the ratings were, to a large 
extent, affected by the means used: Illicit use 
of information was even considered as rather 
tolerable (about 7). Finally, the very small fourth 
cluster was called Always Tolerable . Younger 
participants were, more frequently than older 
ones, members of the Depends on Means cluster 
and were less frequently members of the Always 
Intolerable cluster. They were also the only 
members of the Always Tolerable cluster. 
A majority of participants adopted a zero 
tolerance position,; that is, they clearly 
repudiated tribal ethics. In contrast, only two 
participants expressed views that were fully 
consistent with tribal ethics. Both were male, 
young, relatively poor, less educated, and 
politically unengaged. After the survey was 
completed, one of them spontaneously declared, 
“Everything  in  society  can  be  bought.  When 
you pay the price, you get looked after before 
everyone else. You always can obtain what you 
want”. 
In addition, two groups of participants (second 
and third clusters) expressed a conflict in ethics. 
In the first one, although none of the behaviors 
described  in  the  scenarios  were  considered 
as really tolerable, participants discriminated 
among  them:  Some  behaviors  were  viewed 
as black (threatening a person), other were 
considered dark grey (offering money), and 
some behaviors were seen just grey (using 
information). They recognized that modern 
ethics must always prevail in the situations 
described in the scenarios, but they could not 
prevent themselves from expressing, at the same 
time, the repressed although not suppressed 
demands of tribal ethics. 
In the second group, illicit use of information 
was clearly considered as tolerable, but not 
bribes and threats, which indicates that for these 
participants the domain of validity of tribal 
ethics  is  one  in  which  consequences  can  be 
seen as benign and/or when deviations from the 
dictates of modern ethics are not easily traceable. 
Although, only 7% of participants agreed with 
this last view, this small minority, in addition 
to the very small minority of people who think 
that corruption is always tolerable, is probably 




Liberty vs. oppression: The indivisibility 
of human rights 
 
 
Guédez  Soares  and  Mullet  (2014)  examined 
the extent to which people living in Venezuela 
consider that human rights are indivisible rights: 
Do people perceive human rights as a simple 
collection of more or less independent rights or 
as a bundle of interdependent and related rights? 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly at the end of 1948. It consisted 
of 30 articles that affirmed the representatives’ 
belief “in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the equal rights of men and women”. Diaz- 
Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs (1995) 
examined the psychological structure of these 
articles and showed that US college students’ 
endorsement  of  them  structured  themselves 
into four relatively independent factors: Social 
security   (e.g.,   “Everyone   has   the   right   to 
an adequate standard of living”);, Civilian 
constraint (e.g., “There are times when people 
should be kept from expressing their opinions”);, 
Equality (e.g., “Women and men should have 
equal rights in divorce”);, and Privacy (e.g., “A 
person’s home is his castle and should not be 
interfered with by others”). 
The UDHR included a great variety of rights 
because its writers postulated that these rights 
cannot successfully exist except in combination 
with  each  other.  “The  ideal  of  free  human 
beings enjoying civil and political freedom, and 
freedom from fear can only be achieved if 
conditions are created whereby everyone may 
enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his 
social, economic, and cultural rights”. In other 
words, the authors of the UNDHR considered 
that the right to privacy and the right to express 
one’s opinion cannot be fully experienced apart 
from a context that provides social protection and 
gender equality. Conversely, they considered 
that racial equality and economic security cannot 
be fully appreciated apart from a context offering 
personal rights. 
In the study by Guédez Soares and Mullet 
(2014), 80 participants living in Caracas, 
Barquisimeto, or Maracaibo, aged 18-65, were 
presented with 36 vignettes composed by 
orthogonally crossing of the level of four factors: 
 
a)   the degree to which the state offers social 
protection to the citizens (not at all, 
intermediate, or complete); 
b)   the  level  of  respect  for  civil  liberties 
in the country (no respect, intermediate, 
full respect); 
c)   the   level   of   civil   equality   between 
citizens (inequality of rights vs. equality 
of rights); and 
d)   the level of respect for the private life of 
the citizens (no respect for private life vs. 
full respect for private life). 
 
An example of scenario is the following: 
 
The republic of Birania guarantees the social 
protection  of  the  citizens.  The  State  ensures 
that all citizens have enough income to enjoy 
a decent way of life and the means to maintain 
themselves in good health. Working conditions 
are protected. People with handicaps receive 
adequate support. Civil liberties are guaranteed. 
All the people have the right to express their 
opinions freely in any circumstance. The media 
are free. The citizens cannot be arrested without 
a good reason, and those arrested are entitled to 
legal aid. Equality between citizens is formally 
guaranteed. Men and women have the same 
rights.  Social  minorities  are  not  a  target  of 
any particular discrimination. Religious liberty 
is guaranteed. All citizens, according to their 
means, are entitled to own property. In business 
the rule is to pay all workers in an equal way. 
Finally, private life is fully respected. There 
is not wiretapping. The mail is not opened. A 
person’s home cannot be violated without a 
good reason. Nobody has the right to intrude on 
people's sexual life. (Guédez Soares and Mullet, 
2014) 
 
The question was: To what extent do you 
think that, in this country, human rights are 
respected? Figure 9 shows the main findings. 
Unsurprisingly, the level of respect for human 
rights was considered higher (a) when private 
life was respected in the country than when it 
was not; (b) when citizens had equal rights than 
when they did not; (c) when civil liberty was 
present than when it was absent (M = 1.98); and 
(not shown) (d) when the social protection of the 
population was instituted than when it was not. 
The impact of the social protection factor was, 
however, weaker than the impact of the other 
factors. The interesting and new finding was that 
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all these factors interacted. The judgment model 
can, tentatively, be written: 
Judged  Respect  for  HR  =  Privacy  x  Civil 
Liberties x Equality x Social Protection 
 
Figure 9 
Patterns of results observed on the whole 
sample 
 
In each panel, (a) the mean respect for human 
rights judgments are on the y-axis; (b) the three 
levels of respect for civil liberties are on the 
x-axis; and (c) the two curves correspond to 
the two levels of respect for private life. Each 
panel corresponds to one level of equality 
Source: own work 
 
Lay people in Venezuela considered that (a) 
enjoying one basic right (e.g., enjoying freedom 
of speech) is better than enjoying no right at 
all, that enjoying two basic rights is better than 
enjoying just one, and so on; (b) enjoying any 
right at an intermediate level (e.g., enjoying 
some civil liberty) is not very different from 
not enjoying this right, although it is better; and 
(c) only the complete enjoyment of all basic 
rights can be considered as truly enjoyment of 
human rights. Lay people in Venezuela endorse, 
to a reasonable extent, the view that human 
rights  cannot  be  divided,  in  accordance  with 
the UNDHR (1996) preamble quoted above. 
They did not consider, however, that incomplete 
enjoyment of rights has no value at all. 
The seemingly lower impact of social 
protection as compared with other basic rights 
may be explained by the fact that in relatively 
poor countries, some rights are easier to 
implement  than  others.  Even  in  a  very  poor 
country, equality between genders or equality 
between ethnic groups can be instituted by law, 
even if not easily realized. Even in a very poor 
country, the state and the police can respect the 
right of all people to privacy, at least to a large 
extent. In contrast, building a system of social 
protection supposes adequate funding, which 
many states cannot afford or cannot fully afford. 
This may explain why, from the viewpoint of 
people living in a country that is rich but still 
developing, this basic right is not considered as 






Regarding the domain of care, there was a large 
consensus among participants from Angola, 
Mozambique and France that the moral duty of 
the powerful is to protect the weak. Powerful 
states were expected (a) to prevent mass killings 
at the hands of sociopathic governments in 
fragile countries, and (b) to care for their 
citizens’  health,  even  against  their  citizens’ 
will (e.g., illicit substance consumers). There 
were,  however,  limits  as  regards  the  means 
used for protection. Protective measures must 
be proportional to the real threat. Protective 
measures should not lead people to think they can 
dispense with taking care of themselves. 
As  for  the  domain  of  fairness,  there  was 
also a large consensus among participants from 
Togo,  Rwanda,  and  Martinique  on  the  idea 
that the moral duty of the powerful is, first of 
all, to acknowledge publicly the harm that has 
been inflicted on the weak, even if this harm 
was inflicted by the powerful. Fairness cannot 
be achieved by monetary compensation alone: 
Distributive justice without restorative justice is 
not fairness. Fairness can also not be achieved 
by designating as culpable by association those 
people who were not born at the time the harm 
was inflicted,; that is, the powerful must also 
protect the weak from such misattribution of 
guilt. 
There was also a large consensus among 
people from Bogota that unconditionally 
forgiving the perpetrator of violence against a 
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family member during a civil war is nothing 
else than betrayal. To remain loyal to this family 
member’s  memory  implies  fulfilling  a  series 
of conditions, namely that the perpetrator has 
realized he did a terrible thing and that he was 
not involved in the decision process leading to 
the crime. 
French and Colombian participants did not 
hesitate to express views that were at variance 
with official policies on the control of the sale of 
drugs. In fact, only a minority of them endorsed 
the complete prohibition policy instituted by 
their democratically elected government. This 
does not mean that these participants had no 
respect for political authorities. A majority of 
the French, in particular, were in agreement with 
policies established in the neighboring states of 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Unsurprisingly, disgusting acts such as rape 
or murder, as well as corrupt behaviors from 
the part of powerful people, were considered 
as  intolerable  and  severely  punishable  by  a 
very huge majority of participants in India and 
Colombia. In some places, the level of disgust is 
such that the death penalty was approved by a 
large majority of people. 
Finally, very clear views were expressed by 
Venezuelan participants about the indivisibility 
of human rights. They asserted that liberty cannot 
be attributed bit by bit, and that one kind of right 
cannot be fully enjoyed in separation from other 
human rights. Participants were, however, wise 
enough to consider that having incomplete rights 
is better than having no rights at all. 
Our  hope  is  that  the  set  of  societal  issues 
that have been explored so far using the IIT 
framework will be extended by the many young 
people who attend the Biennial International 
Conference on Information Integration Theory. 
Issues such as social security (the care domain); 
institutional racism and institutional sexism (the 
fairness domain); whistle blowing (the loyalty 
domain); violence, non-violence and resistance 
to oppression (the authority domain); 
prostitution and torture (the disgust domain); or 
civil disobedience (the liberty domain); should 
profitably be explored. The present set of  
studies  illustrates  the  potential  usefulness 
of a complementary way to investigate public 
opinion, a way that focuses on opinion structure 
—by using multiple structured inputs, without 
neglecting opinion diversity— by using cluster 
analysis.  IIT  and  cluster  analysis  potentiate 
their usefulness: Cluster analysis helps IIT 
determine the level of individual differences in 
public opinion while IIT increases the level of 
resolution at which clusters (public’s various 
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